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Through the use of publicly available information and data I have investigated the performance of 
the European Private Equity Industry versus that of the Stoxx 600 stock index in order to create investment 
alternatives that are generally considered in the investment decision making of market participants that 
consider the opportunities in Private Equity investment. Performance of private equity funds, as disclosed 
on the Thomson Reuters Eikon Platform via information shared by Cambridge Associates, have 
demonstrated continuous outperformance versus that of stock market indices that follow the biggest 
European companies’ prices. I have gone on to further discriminate the various categories within the Private 
Equity space and considered only Venture Capital funds and Buyout funds. Buyout funds produced far 
superior results to the equity markets. However, with regards to the Venture Capital funds, performance 














This paper examines the performance of the Private Equity (PE) industry in Europe from the 31st 
of December 1996 until the 31st of December 2016. This paper aims to explain the general concepts 
of PE, how investments are typically originated and carried out with particular focus on Venture 
Capital (VC) and Buyout and Growth (B&G) investment strategies. With the use of existing data, it is 
possible to show the activities performance in the region versus relevant investment destination 
alternative. The benchmark from which comparisons and conclusions shall be drawn from are against 
the returns of index Stoxx Europe 600, this index tracks 600 component European stocks that 
represent large, mid, and small capitalised companies throughout 17 countries in the European 
continent1. Additionally, industry’s returns will be broken down in order to demonstrate if there is 
dominance by the top European PE funds in this landscape. 
Value is the defining aspect of measurement in markets. Economic agents invest with the 
anticipation that upon selling, price will increase by a satisfactory amount to reward them for risking 
with their respective investments. This is true for all investment types, irrespective of asset class. 
Indeed, in our market economy, a company’s ability to generate value for its shareholders and the 
amount of value it creates are the principle measures by which it is judged. Private Equity (PE)2 is a 
broad term used for any equity focused investment in a company that is not listed in a stock market 
by specialised financial firms who will manage these investments through funds. The objective is to 
help companies grow over the long term in order to produce enough capital gain growth for the 
possibility to then orchestrate a successful exit from these investments, via whichever appropriate 
strategy that will achieve the most returns for the respective fund. PE is also ordinarily an alternative 
source of financing for innovative and/or high potential start-ups and an alternative to capital markets 
for companies with an established track record. The industry is normally divided by the stage that a 
fund would initiate its involvement in the target company. Early stage focused VC firms will invest in 
companies initiating their activity, i.e. the take-off phase for target companies, where rapid growth is 
experienced. The benefit of a VC engagement for start-ups is that they provide an excellent accelerator 
platform from which companies in their early stage can grow and develop into market players, 
consequentially also improving the performance for the interested investors. According to CB Insights, 
in September 2017 there were in effect 214 companies in the ‘unicorn’ valuation club (with market 
                                                            
1 See Stoxx Europe 600 profile site: https://www.stoxx.com/index-details?symbol=SXXP 
 
2 Solely for the purpose of this study Private Equity is being defined as an asset class due to the relationship 




valuations exceeding the $1 billion range)3. As over 50% of these start-ups are located outside of the 
USA it is fair to say that start-up, and in turn VC investments, have gone global. Other private equity 
firms focus their funds on late stage and/or the buyout of established targets in order to maximise 
value by attempting to extract the full potential from these companies, and exiting once this is 
considered to of been achieved. 
As illustrated in the Figure 1 example, PE funds are customarily structured in a way that the Limited 
Partners (LP) joins a management team known as the General Partner (GP), they in turn will manage 
the investments for the participating LPs. The PE fund investors hold shares of these LPs and the PE 
funds invest this institutional money into privately targeted companies, typically these investments 
will be structured as equity claims4. An investment vehicle will be created for each individual 
transaction, and is capitalised by the PE fund and other third parties that normally consist of namely 
debt providers and mezzanine investors. This transaction vehicle, managed by the PE fund, will later 
acquire shares in a targeted company and/or will merge with it, thus creating a unique opportunity to 
specify its capital structure and to implement particular claims and incentive structures in 
consequence. The industry was spurred on initially in the 1970s by leveraged buyouts, which involve 
investing through a specialised investment firm using a relatively small portion of equity with a much 
larger amount of outside sourced debt financing. Normally in these structures the general partner 
only provides about 1 percent of the capital required. Capital calls are done by the GP, as well as, when 
they are ready to engage in an investment and thus require the LPs committed capital contributions. 
This technique employed by the PE industry is known as subscription-line financing, where investors 
money is used as a security for financing that is then used for the execution of deals in place of client’s 
capital, it has been witnessed that standard financing in these investments are between 60-90% of 
sourced debts. A portion of which is senior and secured (this is arranged by the corporate investment 
bank involved in the transaction); the remaining portion may consist of junior and unsecured debt 
that produces high yielding bonds. There is also lending that is asset backed by the target companies 
in nature, meaning that the financing covenant will demand that the target company’s assets be 
redeemable in case of default. 
                                                            
3 Please consult the CB Insight research article: https://www.cbinsights.com/research/startup-unicorns-
international-map/ 





The boom in the PE space has led to the creation of several funds with differing investment 
strategies with specific emphasis being given to the target companies’ relative lifecycles. Buyout funds 
are interested in acquiring companies by purchasing majority or controlling stakes, financing the 
transaction through a mix of equity and debt. It was found that it is not common practice for ‘quick 
flips’ to occur, in the European industry especially. Kaplan (1991) found that the average holding 
period is of 6.82 years. Early-stage funds are VC funds that look into investing during the early life 
stage of companies. Growth funds target mature companies that require capital to support expansion 
efforts or improve internal operational capacity. Late-stage funds are a type of VC fund that invest in 
later rounds of funding of targets (typically takes place in C or D rounds). Mezzanine funds will opt to 
use a hybrid of debt and equity financing, comprising of equity-based options (such as warrants) and 
lower-priority (subordinated) debt. Finally, VC funds that have not limited their investments by stages. 
The characteristics of LP investors varies according to their risk appetite. Additionally, the asset 
allocation weighting that each investor attributes to their portfolio for alternative investments varies 
according to their risk profile. These investor risk profiles are determined by the characteristics, 
objectives, and investment philosophy of each one. Traditional participants include, but are not 
limited to, corporate investors that manufacture products and/or may deliver non-financial services. 
Endowment funds are structures (commonly organised by universities, institutions, or other 
foundations) that seek to preserve donations for their future operating necessities. This means that 
the life span of endowments is organised in such a way to target perpetual existence. Family offices 
are entities that facilitate and provide financial services to families. This includes for example wealth 
management services, tax and accounting consulting and other related advice. Government agencies, 
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which are focused on country, region, or development, are other sources of investors. Other asset 
managers (not including banks, endowments, family offices, foundations, insurance company or 
pension funds) manage assets under management into different investment strategies with the 
objective of generating excess financial returns for their clients. Pension funds, both private and state 
controlled, are also active investors in PE funds. Finally, sovereign wealth funds managing, state capital 
contributions are common investors in foreign PE funds, this is to diversify the states portfolio and 
exposures. The investors in these funds observe a stream of cash-flows for the normal duration of a 
fund’s lifecycle; this can usually last for more than 13 years5 until the fund is finally liquidated. Hence, 
time-series estimations may not be applied to measure risk and the abnormal returns of this industries 
fund. 
Jensen (1989) predicted that Private Equity would be the dominant form of a corporate 
organisation. This was predicted because of the organisational ownership structure and their stakes 
in portfolios of companies. The activist nature of a PE funds position in a board of directors is believed 
to positively shake up internal dynamics and therefore lead to better performance in the invested 
company. Secondly, the high incentives for the private equity professionals - this share of a fund’s 
profits are known as the GP’s carried interest, the industry standard is a performance fee of 20%6 on 
profits of the fund. Thirdly, the emphasis on lean and efficient organisations. This was all seen as the 
opposite of public companies at the time. However, the prediction can be considered to have been 
quite premature, due to the crash of the junk bond markets in the early 1990s, which were so popular 
in the previous decade. 
PE traditionally is thought to provide an attractive alternative investment due to its diversification 
benefits. However, benefits can be lower than expected as PE has significant exposure to liquidity risk 
factors, similar to public equity and other alternative classes. Due to high leverage PE is therefore 
sensitive to capital constraints faced by the providers of debt, i.e. the main book runners being banks 
and hedge funds (which are the standard sources of capital for the PE fund financing). Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen (2005) established the theory of availability of capital, which specified that funding 
liquidity is positively related to market liquidity. This translates into low market liquidity forcing PE 
                                                            
5 See Financial News article: Average private equity fund life span exceeds 13 years 
https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/average-private-equity-fund-life-span-exceeds-13-years-20150327 
 





managers to almost certainly finding it much more difficult to refinance investments, hence leading 
to lower returns - a situation that many PE funds are currently in. 
2. Literature Review 
In the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) paper, it was their objective to investigate the performance of 
private equity. They found that the better performing PE partnerships had more success in 
establishing follow-on funds and larger funds. This relationship is concave in nature meaning top 
performers grow proportionally less than average performing partnerships. At the industry level, 
market entry and fund performance are cyclical; however, established funds were much less sensitive 
to these cycles than new entrants in the market. 
In another academic study by Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009), it was concluded that PE 
performance is commonly overstated by the industry associations and in other studies. This is due to 
the use of inflated accounting valuations for ongoing investments and the bias for better performing 
funds being used in applied data sets. Their paper concluded that there is a risk-adjusted 
underperformance by funds of an estimated 6%. By revising the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) paper’s 
subsample they found that by filtering out “six-quarter inactivity” the performance multiplier metric 
was 1,01x (rather than 1,05x as shown by Kaplan and Schoar) and that the Internal Rate of Return was 
of 15% (rather than 19%). Additionally, the number of observations fell to 599 (from 746 in the KS 
study). However, it is relevant to note that matching Kaplan and Schoar sample with precision was 
probably not possible, and that some discrepancies were also noted in Kaplan and Schoar findings. 
Nevertheless, the study originally focussed primarily on the impact of performance of sample selection 
bias, accounting values and fees. It was argued that their starting point for performance measurement 
was not actually relevant, but rather the accounting implemented for sample bias, the use of the 
appropriately weighted profitability indices. Finally, the exclusive use of average-IRR tends to bias 
performance upwards. 
Sorensen and Jagannathan (2013) promoted, previous work done by Kaplan and Schoar (2005), 
having a Public Market Equivalent (PME) measure as a basis of comparison versus Private Equity 
returns. This is because PME’s are valid no matter the risk of the PE investment that is undertaken, 
and it is suitably robust against different variations in the timing, due to the application of stochastic 
discounting, and systematic risks for the underlying cash flows, due to sturdiness against manipulation 
of timings of these same cash flows, along with other risks of GP manipulations. Their paper proves 
that PMEs are an important metric as investors do not have to follow a specific investment strategy 
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to utilise this type of data. PMEs are suitable for ex-post performance usage as there is no need for 
knowledge of betas and/or any other similar parameters. 
L’Her, Stoyanova, Shaw, Scott, and Lai (2016), used the Burgiss dataset to study private equity 
buyout fund performance. Their findings on performance before risk adjustments were consistent 
with those in the Burgiss reports and indicated significant outperformance of buyout fund investments 
versus the CEM benchmark7. They went on to use a bottom-up approach and identified the systematic 
risks of underlying companies in buyout funds to inform an appropriate risk-adjusted benchmark, 
which they then determined to be a levered size- and sector-adjusted public index. After making these 
risk adjustments no significant outperformance of buyout fund investments versus the public market 
equivalent on a dollar-weighted basis occurred. However, the authors still maintained that even 
without significant risk-adjusted outperformance buyout funds can play a valuable role in institutional 
investors’ portfolios. 
Franzoni, Nowak and Phalippou (2012), found that the PE industry diversification benefits 
expected by investors may be lower than anticipated. They state that PE is exposed to the same 
liquidity risk factors as public equity and other alternative asset classes may face. The unconditional 
liquidity risk premium is close to 3% annually and, in a four-factor model8, the inclusion of this liquidity 
risk premium reduces alpha to zero. In addition, they provided evidence that the link between PE 
returns and overall market liquidity due to a ‘funding liquidity channel’9. 
By using data from corporate tax returns to examine the evolution of firms' financial structure, 
and performance after LBOs, the paper produced by Cohn, Mills, and Towery (2013) utilised sample 
of 317 LBOs that occurred between 1995 and 2007. Their findings showed little evidence of operating 
improvements subsequent to an LBO, although consistent with prior studies, they did observe 
operating improvements in the set of LBO firms that have public financial statements. It was also found 
that firms do not reduce leverage after LBOs, even if they generate excess cash flow. Results would 
                                                            
7 CEM is a global benchmarking company; they are an independent provider of benchmarking information for 
large pools of capital including pension funds, endowments/foundations and sovereign wealth funds. For more 
information: http://www.cembenchmarking.com/aboutus/aboutus.aspx 
8 In portfolio management the Carhart four-factor model is an extension of the Fama–French three-factor 
model including a momentum factor for asset pricing of stocks. Momentum in a stock is described as the 
tendency for the stock price to continue rising if it is going up and to continue declining if it is going down. 
9 One of the objectives of this paper was to study the impact that market liquidity has on the performance of 
PE returns. This correlation explains the availability of funding for the purchase of target assets to the better 




suggest that effecting a sustained change in capital structure is a conscious objective of the LBO 
structure. 
The ongoing debate in PE literature has been whether funds really do add real value to the 
economy. Much of the literature supports and states that once a company is in the hands of the PE 
funds its free cash flow increases10. However, PE funds may pay too much for companies and suffer in 
large transaction costs when buying and selling respective business units. Therefore, the benefits they 
bring to companies that have been invested in may not translate into superior returns for the principal 
investors of the PE fund. In that case value is captured by other agents. A related issue is that fees 
charged by funds to the LPs may be too large, this means that the fund may be outperforming 
benchmarks net of fees but then go on to underperform after fees due to the fee inclusion effect 
during the fund’s lifespan. In this case value is being added but investors would be paying too much 
for this financial intermediation by the respective GP. In a study11 on the relationship between 
management contract terms and the performance of PE funds, that utilised a proprietary database to 
gather fund cash flow behaviours and other metrics from 1984 to 2010, concluded that there is no 
evidence to suggest that higher fees or lower managerial ownership are associated with lower net-of-
fee performance of the respective funds. Nevertheless, compensation rises and shifts to performance 
insensitive components during fundraising booms. The evidence suggests that managers with higher 
fees deliver higher gross performance, and highlights that agency costs are an inevitable consequence 
of the information frictions prevalent in these agency relations. This further supports their findings 
that net-of-fee performance is strongly negatively correlated with management fees of private equity 
funds, charged by the general partner. 
3. Methodology 
Private Equity investments are considered riskier and more illiquid than many other asset classes, 
for this reason institutional investors that have the risk profile to withstand such investment 
characteristics expect their returns to be sufficiently high to compensate for this same risk. In this 
paper publicly available information was utilised in order to find the returns for the limited partners 
in the private equity limited partnerships to examine the returns over their respective investment 
horizon. 
                                                            
10 See Cumming, Siegel and Wright (2007) 
11 See Robinson and Sensoy (2013) 
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The industry standard measure for performance is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) from the 
creation of the PE fund. IRR measures PE fund returns based on all the cash flows that have gone in 
and out of the fund, including the Net Asset Value of the fund, and most closely reflect the return an 
investor may expect to achieve if they invest at the start of a fund. The returns are time-weighted and 
are expressed in percentage values. 
 
As demonstrated in the graph above, even though hypothetical in shape, it is typical for a LP in a 
limited partnership agreement to expect the fund’s IRR to be negative initially. This is due to capital 
call contributions that are required at moment zero (even though PE funds are not required to call all 
committed capital at this stage). Why does this weigh negatively for fund returns? Put simply, this is 
linked to fund organisation expenses, management fees charged by the GP, fund expenses, and 
portfolio expenses. Fund structures are expensive as there are many different requirements that must 
be fulfilled and these will vary by local requirements and specificities (examples include legal, 
accounting, tax, and other miscellaneous expenses involved in this phase of a fund’s life cycle). 
Management fees and fund expenses are charged regardless of fund performance. Finally, there is the 
interesting practice of recognising losses early on in the cycle - this means that GPs will mark-down or 
write-off the carry value of poor investments as they are recognised by the fund. This in turn results 
in early performance to suffer. Therefore, a J-Curve appears along individual funds return graphs and 
they will be more pronounced early on, especially for VC funds where 50%-60% of the funds seed and 
early-stage investments may not return capital. However, B&G Funds experience shallower J-Curves 
as their investments are typically in larger companies with good cash flows. 
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End-to-End IRR allows for the computation of the return of groups of PE funds with differing 
inception dates. Inception dates are also known as the vintage year of a fund, meaning that it is the 
year in which a fund first draws down capital from its investors. This allows for better comparison of 
PE returns to those of other asset classes over a similar period of time and for the returns of funds at 
different life cycles to be combined. These long-term IRRs are considered to be the most indicative of 
PE performance across different stages of the economic cycles and are considered as headline 
measurements of performance. Whilst for short-term considerations returns should be viewed with 
caution, as PE is a long-term investment. However, shorter period returns may be indicative of the 
general performance of PE over this short period. In this paper I considered the Pooled-IRR (P-IRR), 
and this reflects the aggregate (“pooled”) of all cash flows and ending Net-Asset Values (NAV) to 
calculate a money-weighted return. 
The P-IRR is the measurement method that is generally considered as extracting the most 
accurate calculation. The P-IRR is the standard method used for a group of funds, as opposed to the 
average rate of return across funds. P-IRR utilises the actual cash flows of private equity funds, rather 
than the simply using average levels of cash flows. The equal weighted returns, as the name suggests, 
allows for return method to give equal importance to all components that make up a fund’s 
performance. This means that equal weighting is given from the smallest companies to the largest 
ones. Capitalisation weighted rates of return is a type of IRR that allocates more weight to those 
components with larger total market capitalisation. Therefore, the higher the market capitalisation of 
a company, i.e. the larger the market value of the company, the more weight the results will have as 
a component for calculating capital weighted returns, and vice-versa. 
Characteristics on PE fund performance are not readily available due to the limited disclosures of 
financial information from these funds being readily available to the public. Access to financial data is 
restrictive in the sense that normally one needs to request this information directly from funds, or be 
willing to go through extensive paywalls on professional financial platforms (like Thomson Reuters 
Eikon or Bloomberg terminals). Information regarding VC, B&G and the general European PE funds 
returns and performances were extracted through Thomson Reuter’s Eikon platform. With Eikon, 
generalised information on returns to LPs, net of management fees, was extracted between 1996 and 
2016. Returns are measured by their IRR, and each partnership is based on the capital contributions 
made into the fund (considered as negative cash flows by LPs), distributions to LPs (positive cash 
flows), and the valuation of assets that remain in the partnership (known as the terminal value). As 
previously stated, distributions to LPs are net of management fees and other partnership expenses 
that may have been incurred. They presented a capitalisation weighted IRR which weigh the 
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partnership’s internal rate of return by the size of the partnerships as well as the median IRR. The 
industry statistics extracted from Thomson Reuters Eikon are an aggregation of data figures according 
to the country of origin of the PE fund, i.e. the GP in the fund partnership structure in charge of the 
investment. At a European level, this relates to investments made by European PE funds regardless of 
the location of the target company, i.e. the companies in which funds invested into may be in any 
location around the globe. The equity value is the amount of capital invested to acquire shares in an 
enterprise. The equity value includes equity, quasi-equity12, mezzanine, unsecured debt and secured 
debt to be provided by the private equity firm.  
 
In Figure 3, one is able to visualise an introductory view into the performance of the European 
PE industry based on its P-IRR. This demonstrates that over this 20-year sample horizon B&G funds 
have tended to outperform the general industry, and produce much better returns in comparison to 
                                                            
12 Category of debt that has partial equity characteristics, examples of quasi-equity include mezzanine debt 




1. All data shown as net to Limited Partners, unless otherwise noted.
2. All IRRs greater than one year are annualized.
3. Vintage Year definition: First Cash Flow, Quartile Methodology: Rank Selected Sample.







1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Figure 3: Pooled Net IRR by European Fund Type
Total EU - Pooled IRR VC EU - Pooled IRR Buyout EU - Pooled IRR
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VCs. Even following the financial crisis of 2008, P-IRR in B&G funds remained constant around the 
15% level. 
The variance measures the dispersion of a set of data points around that data’s mean value, this 
is a measure of risk so this statistic can help determine the risk an investor may undertake when 
investing in a specific asset class. Standard deviation is also relevant due to two major factors, being 
that, firstly, it measures the dispersion of a data set from the mean. The more the spread is in the 
data, the higher the deviation will be. Secondly, in finance especially, the standard deviation is applied 
to the annual rate of return of an investment to measure the investment’s inherent volatility. Leading 
to the standard deviation also being known as the historical volatility, and is used as a gauge by 
investors for the amount of expected volatility that one may find from investing in a certain asset class, 
i.e. a volatile stock will have a very high standard deviation number while a stable stock will have a 
lower standard deviation. The large dispersion will allow one to conclude on how much the fund’s 




Through Figures 4 and 5 the visualisation of IRR by quartiles for the sampled time horizon, B&G 
funds have performed better than VC during this period, including the top 25th-percentile. The 
difference in performance may be due to more buyout funds reaching the capital distribution phase 
earlier. Due to the higher risk nature of VC funds, demonstrated in standard deviation data, more 
funds are at risk of entering default. VC funds have grown more in popularity compared to B&G in 
Europe. This is shown by the increase in the compounded annual growth rate of VCs (11.59%), whilst 
the number of buyout funds was lower (9.74%), this however reinforces the argument that VCs are 
simply more fashionable but that not enough capital distribution is received by LPs (due to invested 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Bottom - 25% 0% -1% -10% -4% -8% -25% -38% -31% -22% -15% -12% -14% -17% -16% -13% -10% -10% -9% -8% -7% -7%
Median 4% 2% 1% 3% 6% -7% -22% -19% -15% -6% -5% -5% -7% -7% -3% -1% -1% -1% 2% 3% 2%
Top - 75% 10% 12% 5% 17% 33% 10% 0% -2% 0% 5% 5% 6% 3% 3% 6% 8% 10% 10% 12% 19% 15%
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Bottom - 25% -2% 0% -8% 0% -5% -6% -11% -10% -6% -1% 0% -1% -14% -8% -2% 0% 2% 3% 3% 3% 4%
Median 6% 10% 4% 9% 10% 5% 2% 4% 7% 10% 13% 13% 7% 7% 10% 10% 10% 10% 11% 11% 11%
























Figure 4: European VC IRR Quartiles by Year



























Figure 5: European Buyout IRR Quartiles by Year
Upper Quartile (LP) (%) Median (LP) (%) Lower Quartile (LP) (%)
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start-up companies never passing to a mature stage in their lifecycle). As demonstrated by the above 
figures the performance of B&G funds has been absolute in all facets of each class’ demography.   
The public equity market is a significant factor when considering benchmarking PE performance. 
The PME (public market equivalent) seeks to equate the heavily time dependent returns of the PE 
funds with the returns of public market indices. The measure is a ratio of the net outflows from PE 
funds re-invested into the public index to the end of the fund’s life divided by the inflows into the PE 
funds invested in the public index until the end of the fund’s life. A ratio above 1 indicates that an 
outperformance of the PE has occurred, whereas a ratio under 1 reflects an under performance by 
the Stock Index versus a PE fund. The data indicates at times that PE returns exceed substantially the 
returns of the stock Index, especially funds with a buyout strategy implemented. To a certain extent, 
returns are determined by the availability of capital. For both venture and non-venture capital 
investments have been greatest on investments made during periods when relatively small amounts 
of capital were available, but other factors exist that can explain high returns during these periods. 
Conversely, concern that greater capital availability may depress future returns. Data also suggests 
that returns for B&G and later-stage VC are higher than early-stage partnerships. This pattern may 
partly explain the faster growth of later-stage and particularly, non-venture sectors of the private 
equity market over the past fifteen years. 
It is important to consider that returns on cash flows and portfolio value data are disclosed by 
the PE managers (additionally, the IRR performance calculation solves for the discount rate that makes 
the Net Present Value of a set of cash flows equal to zero). The calculation is based on cash-on-cash 
returns over equal periods modified for the residual value of a fund’s equity (i.e. NAV). The residual 
value attributed to each respective group being measured is its ending value. The Eikon database 
accounts for cash flows on a daily basis, or otherwise on a monthly basis, and the NAVs are considered 
on a quarterly basis. End-to-end performance calculation is similar to since inception IRR, however, it 
measures the return between two points in time. The calculation takes into account the opening NAV, 
the in-period cash flows and the closing NAV. Returns are then annualised for comparability. 
Multiple ratio considerations from private equity statistical data are known as the Total Value to 
Paid-In (TVPI), Distributed to Paid-In (DPI) and the Residual Value to Paid-In (RVPI). The TVPI is the 
ratio of the current value of remaining investments within a fund, plus the total value of all 
distributions to date, relative to the total amount of capital paid into the fund to date. The Global 
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Investment Performance Standards was developed by the Chartered Financial Analyst Institute13 and 
it states that any recallable distributions should be included in the numerator of this ratio. Also, any 
reinvested capital, resulting from recallable distributions, should be included in the denominator. This 
performance measurement is preferred and considered as the best available measure to consider 
before the end of a fund’s life. TVPI is an aggregate performance metric that is measured after pooling 
cash flows from the net-asset values of a sample. The DPI is the ratio of money that is distributed to 
the limited partner, of the partnership, by the invested fund relative to the contribution made. In the 
case of the RVPI the ratio of the current value of all remaining investments within a fund to the total 
contributions of Limited Partners to date. The standards also dictate that any reinvested capital 
(resulting from recallable distributions) should be included in the denominator of this ratio. With these 
performance metrics it allows for informed investors to determine what their outlook is for their 
investments. There are many ways to do this and to evaluate the performance of funds. The main 
methods considered are via: absolute returns; comparative returns to other similar funds (via a 
quartile analysis); or a comparative return to the public markets (via PME analysis). 
4. Performance 
The STOXX Europe 600 index was initiated in 1998, and as the figure shows there is a temporal 
difference between the PE industry and its P-IRR index (this is due to the PE industry activity preceding 
that of the STOXX Europe 600), first transaction date year noted by Thomson Reuters Eikon was 
registered in 1986 and this was a Venture Capital fund transaction that was established (first buyout 
fund registered was in 1987)14. In a general sense, I found that the European PE fund industry has 
outperformed the market index during most of the period from 1999 to 2016, two thirds of the sample 
period used in the benchmark resulted in P-IRR for the funds generating better returns than that of 
the STOXX 600 index. The average return for European PE funds since 1996 to 2016 has been of 14,7%, 
whilst for the stock index the average return from 1998 to 2016 has been of 4%. The best performance 
year for the European index was 2009, but this is justified due to adverse market conditions for 
European PE sector having experienced a slow-down in growth from the financial crisis that (e.g. the 
Greek economic collapse) affected fund performance and the European highs pre-Sovereign Debt 
Crisis that caused turmoil in European markets. However, European funds still experienced double-
digit growth of 12%, due mostly to the strong performance experienced in the PE buyout markets, for 
2009. The strong performance from the PE funds was underlined from the buyout funds having had a 
                                                            
13 Please refer to the CFA Global Investment Performance Standards website, Global Investment Performance 
Standards (GIPS) Handbook (3rd edition – 2012), Chapter 3 – Explanation of the Provisions of the GIPS 
Standards, 3-7 Private Equity, page 276: https://www.gipsstandards.org/standards/pages/currentedition.aspx 
14 See Thomson Reuters Eikon Data set in Appendix A 
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very strong result during this sample period. It was found that buyout funds out performed the stock 
index for 72% of the time during this 18-year period sample; best years having been 2001 
(outperforming by 35%), 2003 (with an outperformance of 46%), and the best year having been 2008 
(outperforming STOXX EU 600 by 60%). The average pooled return for buyout funds from 1996 was 
17%, and 16% from 1999 to 2016. This means that the buyout funds performed four times better than 
the Stoxx 600 returns for this sample period. The worst years of performance for buyout funds were 
1999 (-12%), 2005 (-6%), and the worst having been 2009 (-13%). However, this story does not carry 
over for the venture capital funds. It was found that the stock index outperformed the VC funds 56% 
of the time in our sample period. The best performance of the European VC funds having been 2000 
(+25% versus Stoxx 600), 2001 (+32% versus Stoxx 600), and 2002 (+41% versus Stoxx 600) this strong 
performance may be justified by the strong results coming from invested companies in the dot com 
boom period of the early 2000s. Unfortunately, immediately after this strong period of results we find 
that the VC funds underperformed constantly for four years. Peak year for VC funds was 2008 (+49% 
outperformance versus Stoxx 600). Poorest years for the VC funds were 1999 (-22% versus Stoxx 600), 
2005 (-17% versus Stoxx 600), and 2009 (with -25% versus Stoxx 600). 
 
The total average PE standard deviation for the sample period was 28% for the LP investor 
returns, standard deviation was never below 20%, this demonstrates the inherent risk and diverging 
results that different fund strategies yield for the respective stakeholders. Going deeper into the 
different investing strategies performed, for the VC funds it was found that overall standard deviation 
numbers were exactly in line with that of the industry as a whole. However, buyout focused funds are 
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seen to be much more volatile, with an average standard deviation of 29%, and the most volatile years 
having been 1999 (35%) and 2008 (35%). After performing a standard deviation measurement for the 
stock index returns it was found that, from the 31st of December 1999 until the 31st of December 2016 
(period end of sample), the STOXX Europe 600 Index had a standard deviation value of 20%. This 
further demonstrates the risky nature of private equity investing, as traditional stocks are less volatile 
in nature than investing in either start-ups or buyout struggling businesses, therefore justifying the 
higher returns that these funds generate as alternative assets for risk seeking investors that are short 
on volatility. 
 
As shown in Figure 7, this graphic was derived from the performance measures for the European 
PE Fund industry as a whole. This means that my consideration included all available strategies, 
through the Thomson Reuters Eikon platform (i.e. Buyout & Growth Equity, Venture Capital, 
Mezzanine & Distressed, Natural Resources, Real Estate, Infrastructure, and Fund of Funds & 
Secondary Funds). From this we interpret that TVPI returns have always been above 1.2x for the 
European PE fund industry, over the sampled horizon. In my interpretation, this graphic is important 
to notice the high levels of DPI, which stands at roughly above 0,6x through the period. This is relevant, 
once more, as DPI is the figure that represents money that is paid out to the LPs in these fund 
structures, and therefore the higher the DPI the better the performance and returns of these 
investments for involved investors. RVPI is the residual value that remains invested within the fund 
and the portfolio company investments. The graph in figure 5 demonstrates the best performing 
period for European PE funds was in 2006, with the lowest point being in 2003. Highest DPI 
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performance metric for this general group at 0,87x, whilst the lowest multiple was also in 2003 at 
0,55x. The RVPI metric stands with the highest period being in 1999 as 0,93x, and the lowest point 
being at year 2008 with the metric at 0,48x. For a LP it is important that funds have high DPIs and low 
RVPI. The low RVPI value in 2008 may be a consequence of the financial crisis where there where GPs 
preferred to distribute values and not risk investing in an uncertain environment. 
 
The performance statistics for VC funds in Figure 8, however, are not as cheerful. With the highest 
reaching TVPI reaching 1,8x in 2000, bear in mind that this was during the heights of the tech bubble 
and many companies had extremely high valuations hence providing interesting conditions for exit 
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opportunities to VC funds (DPI performance for LPs invested at the time was of 1,04x). This period was 
followed by a significant reduction in fund performance, as the bubble burst in 2001, leading to a 
substantial recovery in performance only occurring in 2013 where TVPI was at 1,2x (and DPI 
performance stagnated at 0,6x for LPs). The lowest point during this period of stagnation for VC funds 
was in 2009 where TVPI reached only 1,03x. B&G Funds, in Figure 9, performed relatively better when 
compared to the VC counterpart. Even though the best performing years for B&G funds was on the 
lead up to the Great Financial Recession, where valuations where at highs and weighed favourably on 
results for funds, at just 1,63x (0,17x comparative difference to VC best performing year), overall, this 
strategy has consistently outperformed VC. The only exception was in 1998 where VC TVPI 
performance came in at 1,43x and B&G funds was at 1,37 (slight underperformance to peer in direct 
comparison of -4%). Even with distributions to B&G funds did outperform VCs, however, it is 
interesting to note that VCs increased and have higher distribution ratios versus B&G (and from highs 
of 74% of TVPI being distributed, this tendency continued until 2006 with distribution levels above 
63% consistently). This is only interrupted during the financial crisis (2007-08) and once more since 
2013 to 2016. 
In terms of overall performance, both VC and B&G strategies had moments of outperformance 
comparative to the general market (VC only outperformed categorically in 2000, with B&G on average 
producing results better than the general European PE fund industry more than 3% in TVPI terms). 
This situation is somewhat repeated when considering only DPI values, as B&G only began to 




Figure 10 above demonstrates returns and performance for European funds, as of the 31st of 
December of 2016; however, the defining characteristic is the vintage of each fund category. These 
vintages are only considered at the moment where the first cash flow events from funds take place. 
In these tables we have returns and multiples calculated in pooled terms, thus taking into 
consideration the individual cash flows of several different funds in the final values. In the figure 
above three vintages where chosen in order to perform a straight comparison of the performance of 
the different strategies. The choice was based on the oldest group, the youngest group, and the 
most populace group within the sample of European PE Funds. 
When performing an absolute analysis of these figures it is easier to deduce that the worst 
performing strategy has been VC funds. According to the J-curve assumption mentioned beforehand, 
we see that older vintages are the best performers as of the 31st of December of 2016. This is due to 
the stage of investments that are now more mature and producing constant above public market 
returns for the funds, the case for younger vintages are that of subdued rates of returns as lifecycle 
of investments are still in the contributing phase for most funds. The best performing funds are 
Figures 10: Benchmark Statist ics by Vintage Year and Fund Strategy
PE Funds VC Funds Buyout Funds
Strategy All Venture Capital Buyout & Growth Equity
Vintage Year 1989 1989 1989
Vintage Year by First Cash Flow First Cash Flow First Cash Flow
Geographic Focus Europe Europe Europe
Measurement Date 31-12-2016 31-12-2016 31-12-2016
Net IRR 19% 18% 19%
TVPI 2,04x 2,02x 1,95x
DPI 2,04x 2,02x 1,95x
RVPI 0,00x 0,00x 0,00x
PE Funds VC Funds Buyout Funds
Strategy All Venture Capital Buyout & Growth Equity
Vintage Year 2006 2006 2006
Vintage Year by First Cash Flow First Cash Flow First Cash Flow
Geographic Focus Europe Europe Europe
Measurement Date 31-12-2016 31-12-2016 31-12-2016
Net IRR 6% 5% 7%
TVPI 1,44x 1,42x 1,49x
DPI 0,98x 0,64x 1,15x
RVPI 0,46x 0,78x 0,34x
PE Funds VC Funds Buyout Funds
Strategy All Venture Capital Buyout & Growth Equity
Vintage Year 2016 2016 2016
Vintage Year by First Cash Flow First Cash Flow First Cash Flow
Geographic Focus Europe Europe Europe
Measurement Date 31-12-2016 31-12-2016 31-12-2016
Net IRR 2% -25% -22%
TVPI 1,01x 0,84x 0,91x
DPI 0,01x 0,00x 0,00x
RVPI 1,00x 0,84x 0,91x
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those found in the general European PE fund grouping (that includes all different strategies of PE 
investing) with a vintage of 1989, this may be explained due to the benefits of a large and diversified 
portfolio that is not too heavily exposed into one strategy, sector, or fund size (and etc.). On the 
other side of the coin, and with little surprise, the worst performer are VC funds grouped into the 
2016 vintage. It can also be mentioned that this reinforces the argument that the VC industry, 
through its predominant position in the tech sector, is more volatile and demanding of sunken costs 
that way especially negatively on early rates of return for investors.  
For the LPs the most critical metric is the DPI, therefore the higher this value is the better the 
distributions that flow to LPs within fund structures. TVPI = DPI + RVPI, in this formula the RVPI 
represents the residual value that remains within the fund structure and the portfolio company 
investments. The residual value is a moving target for investors, and evaluation depends on the 
vintage of a fund. As the portfolio of companies ages it may not perform as expected and so may sell 
for less than the value the fund is reporting. For 2006 vintage of VC funds have a DPI of 0,64x, which 
means that almost 45% (0,64 / 1,42 = 45%) of the face value of these investments have been 
distributed to their respective LPs. Whilst the best performing distributions were by the oldest 
vintage category, but this is purely as 100% of portfolio face value has already been distributed to 
LPs. This may be due to these funds possibly being close to end of life. This consideration aside, from 
the ‘active’ groups, the best performing metric are the B&G Funds from 2006 (where the DPI 
represents 77% of this vintage’s TVPI). Overall, comparing VC funds of the same vintage one may 
draw the conclusion that its investment portfolio is probably not as developed, and possibly still 
climbing the J-curve (both in terms of the -2% in Net IRR and -32% in the DPI, differentials compared 
to B&G Funds of the same 2006 vintage). Therefore, B&G Funds from an absolute return approach 




The act of comparing funds with other funds is a very common method to evaluate its 
performance. In brochures and other prospectuses, it is normal to find that GPs call themselves ‘top-
quartile’, this means that they are considering their fund to be in the top 75th percentile amongst peers 
within the same vintage. Therefore, the objective of the following was to obtain and display the 
statistical outcomes for the sampled funds15. This information aides in the comparison of performance 
according to their vintages, using IRR, TVPI, and DPI. Following a comparative quartile analysis of the 
funds by vintage year and fund strategy the first conclusion that one reaches is that the earlier the 
vintage of the fund the higher the IRR, TVPI, and DPI are found to be. This is justified, once more, is 
validated by the J-curve assumption that is prominent in PE returns, given the lifespan characteristics 
and dynamics (distributions and contributions) within funds. In Figure 11, the time differential is due 
to the lack of readily available information by the PE funds themselves or a lack of funds associated to 
a specific vintage year. Even so, the higher levels of the TVPI and DPI demonstrate that the better 
performing funds are found once a certain level of maturity is reached. In the sampled period of this 
paper it seems that only vintages 7 years older than 2016 start to perform favourably for LPs, as 
                                                            
15 It is important to note that there is the risk of reporting lags. This is due to financial information is 
transmitted to LPs only after the reporting period. Therefore, as consequence the industry benchmark reports 
will lag potentially by several months. However, in this sample only the same reporting periods were 
considered (2nd Quarter of June 2017). 
Figures 11: Benchmark Statistics by Vintage Year and Fund Strategy - Quartile Analysis
Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile 
1989 19% 17% 6% 2,04x 1,84x 1,66x
2016 -3% -14% -25% 0,97x 0,89x 0,84x
Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile 
1989 2,04x 1,84x 1,66x 0,00x 0,00x 0,00x
2016 0,00x 0,00x 0,00x 0,97x 0,89x 0,84x
Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile 
1999 -2% -7% -8% 0,84x 0,59x 0,47x
2014 38% 26% 14% 1,47x 1,34x 1,24x
Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile 
1999 0,82x 0,50x 0,42x 0,07x 0,02x 0,00x
2014 0,10x 0,00x 0,00x 1,45x 1,24x 0,96x
Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile 
1990 27% 21% 14% 2,88x 2,69x 1,79x
2016 -4% -12% -21% 0,96x 0,92x 0,85x
Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile Upper Quartile Median Lower Quartile 
1990 2,88x 2,69x 1,79x 0,00x 0,00x 0,00x





Benchmark Statist ics  - European Venture Capital  Funds as of the 31st of December 2016



















distributions from funds starts to compensate their investments. This once again demonstrates the 
criticality of DPI considerations when analysing the PE industry. However, only VC funds with 1999 
vintage had negative IRR but this effect is mute as distributions to LPs continued at higher multiples 
as opposed to younger vintages in this sample. By focusing only on 2016 vintages, upper quartile IRR 
returns for general European PE Fund group underperforms relative to pooled IRR figures, -3% versus 
2% respectively, representing a 5% unfavourable differential for the sampled upper quartile 
difference. Whilst for the 1989 vintage for the same group category have the same IRR values (19%). 
For the B&G Fund 2016 vintage group the upper quartile is producing returns of -4% which is better 
compared to the pooled returns that show negative gains of -22%, hence demonstrating a better 
performance for the upper quartile.  
Comparing pooled IRR for VC (2016)16 versus the 2014 vintage performance for the upper quartile 
(in 2016) the upper quartile outperforms the pooled IRR by 31% (pooled IRR of 7% versus upper 
quartile 38%). Moving to TVPI analysis, both upper quartiles in B&G and general group are roughly 
similar (standing at 0,96x and 0,97x). An important consideration is here is that RVPI is at a maximum 
in the 2016 vintage as most of the value remains within the portfolio. In the beginning of a fund’s life 
this is expected, however later on the optimum choice is one where the DPI is high and the RVPI is 
low. 
5. Market Dynamics and Entry of Funds 
There are three premises that lie beneath the PE boom. Firstly, PE funds are profitable when they 
improve purchased company’s performance. Secondly, it is a common belief PE funds have less risk 
exposure than public markets. Thirdly, it is believed that PE funds will outperform any other 
comparative asset class investments, in terms of returns offered. 
The banking sector does not make superior equity investments compared to those of stand-alone 
PE groups. Instead, banks will rather use these PE engagements to take advantage of the credit market 
booms, and get the private benefits of cross-selling other services. Banks can, and on occasion do, 
invest in PE as equity investors, or equity and debt financiers. The former are knowns as ‘bank-
affiliated’, whilst the latter are known as ‘parent-financed’ deals. The Volcker Rule covered banks that 
used their position as a ‘bank-affiliated’ partner to grow revenues and in consequence increase 
volatility. They have the incentives to do so, because of equity values increasing volatility, and large 
banks enjoy implicit bail-out guarantees. Banks also enjoy information collaborations from combining 
                                                            
16 See Appendix - table 4  
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different activities, which may be considered a positive externality for the market in general, because 
bank involvement is a positive signal on the quality of the deal to other outside investors. However, it 
cannot be understated that banks do have a cross selling motivation behind their involvement17. 
Therefore, parent-financing is a concern for policy makers as a source to ‘originate and distribute’ debt 
in debt markets, as considered risky during the peak of the market and may amplify the cyclicality of 
investments to the credit market. 
Asymmetric information may lead to the operating improvements and value creation potentially 
consistent with PE investors having superior quality of information on future company performance. 
Asymmetric information suggests that actual performance should beat forecast but the opposite takes 
place. Notwithstanding the strength of asymmetric information effects on returns may be mitigated 
by the fact that PE firms usually bring in new management18. 
6. PE Firms, Funds, and Transactions 
Besides the most prominent firms, such as Blackstone, Carlyle, and KKR, there has been an 
explosion of private equity activity around the globe. Europe has not been left behind from this growth 
in activity, with thousands of funds having been created since the mid-1990s. The top five largest 
funds19 this papers found in our search parameter over the past twenty years were CVC Capital 
Partners Ltd (United Kingdom– Buyout fund, invested in 202 companies since inception), European 
Investment Fund (Luxembourg – Fund-of-funds, invested in 180 companies), Wendel SA (France – 
Buyout Fund, invested in 19), Permira Europe IV (United Kingdom– Buyout fund, invested in 24 
companies), and lastly SoftBank Vision Fund L.P. (United Kingdom– Generalist fund, invested in 10 
companies). CVC Capital Partners invested a total of 5.8 billion euros during this paper’s sample time 
horizon, whilst Ardian SA (France) with 1.4 billion euros was the fund that invested the least. 
Funds will normally have a lifespan of 13 years20, with a possible extension of 3 years. The 
management of these funds are based on basic covenants of operation, that cover a range of issues 
of concern ranging from investment amount limits allowed in each company, the debt level allowed 
at firm level (opposed to the debt level on a portfolio level for the fund, which is unlimited), and 
                                                            
17 See Hellmann, Lindsay, and Puri (2008): Building relationships early: Banks in Venture Capital 
18 See Acharya, Gottshalg, Hahn, & Kahoe (2009), Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from 
Private Equity 
19 Largest by the sum of equity invested in paper’s search range, see Appendix – Table 12 






whether the fund is a closed end one (where investors cannot remove values invested into the fund 
until it is terminated). CVC European Equity Partners V, L.P. (UK)21 was the fund with the highest 
average amount invested in by LPs, with an average of 385 million euros per investor (/company). The 
fund with the highest number of investors was Bpifrance Investissement SAS (France)22, with 432. The 
highest spender per deal on average, during our sample investment horizon, was found to be 
Spinnaker Capital, Ltd. (UK)23. The fund with the most deals done in our search range was 3i24 (captive 
from published accounts) with a total of 712 deals completed. 
According to Metrich & Yasuda (2007), GPs will be compensated in the following three ways. 
Firstly, an annual management fee, determined with investors as a percentage of the capital 
committed. A share of the fund’s profits is reserved for the GP. This value is in excess to the amount 
that the GP contributes to the partnership. It is also known as the carried interest, or simply the carry. 
Lastly, it is common for deal and monitoring fees to also be charged based on the fund’s portfolio 
investments undertaken. Buyouts are typically financed with between 60% to 90% debt, generally a 
mix in finance sourcing is used and a portion of which is senior and secured, arranged through 
investment/ corporate banks, and another portion would involve junior debt that is unsecured, and 
included in the mix would be high yielding bonds created specifically for fund financing. PE firms from 
investors to cover 10% to 40% of purchase price. New management team of bought out company 
would typically contribute to the equity of their respective firm, although the amounts could be 
considered small factors. 
Overall, in an expected sense, the PE industry transactions and fundraising exhibit similar 
cyclicality. Both being sensitive to the economic climate of the source region. Since the start of the 
century large amount of deal flows and fundraising activities have increased considerably recently. 
7. Performance Data Analysis 
An important question to ask is whether PE firms actually do influence the firms’ performance 
that they invest in - this may seem like a complicated question to answer because PE firms will turn 
their companies’ private and consequentially mask their financial data from the public scrutiny. The 
industry would have us believe simply that we must consider their results thus far demonstrations of 
outperformance by GP managers, who steer funds towards superior growth and produce superior 
                                                            
21 See Appendix – table 13 
22 See Appendix - table 14 
23 See Appendix – table 15 




performance for both the invested companies as well as their fund investors. A solution to this 
obstacle for investors is to consider the Fama-French Three-Factor25 Regression. 
 
In Figure 12, to measure PE industry versus the public market the regression model was 
employed. The data used was extracted from two principal sources – Thompson Reuters Eikon and 
Professor Kenneth French’s Dartmouth University Data Library26 (that is updated regularly) was 
extracted. Factor coefficients and Risk-Free return values were extracted for the European Fama-
French Three-Factor model, data is specific for the developed European countries (16 countries), all 
returns are denominated in American Dollars (USD), and the market is the region’s value weighted 
portfolio minus the US one-month T-bill rate27.  
PE returns are once more P-IRR, however denominated in USD. Stoxx Europe 600 prices have 
also been converted into USD, respective expected returns were used, for this model. Due to PE data 
constraints, yearly returns for Fama-French regression modelling and Sharpe Ratio analysis were 
extracted from respective platforms and data list. In total only 18 observations were possible, as Stoxx 
Europe 600 was only established in the latter stages of 1998. SMB factor stands for ‘Small minus Big’ 
and HML factor stands for ‘High minus Low’. Representing beta coefficients,  and ℎ are variables 
representing small cap and large cap portfolios that are between 0 and 1 in value. 
Results from the Fama-French Regression model were possible after calculating the excess 
returns for each variable. Firstly, the difference in R-squared between the European PE industry (Total, 
VC and B&G) and the public market index is quite significant. This is specifically notable with VC versus 
                                                            
25The formula for the Fama-French Three-Factor Model: − = + − +
+  
26 Refer to the following website: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
27 Further information on Fama-French Factor data found in the following website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/f-f_3developed.html 
 European countries within scope include: Austria; Belgium; Switzerland; Germany; Denmark; Spain; Finland; 
France; Great Britain; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Sweden  
Figure 12: PE Industry and Stoxx 600 Fama-French 3 Factor Regression, 1999-2016
Variables Total European Private Equity
European Venture Capital 
Funds
European Buyout and Growth 
Funds
Stoxx 600 Europe Index
13,963*** 5,753*** 16,076*** -2,98***
(0,4568) (0,5142) (0,4323) (0,3444)
0,079 -0,025 0,084*** 0,967***
(0,0215) (0,0242) (0,0204) (0,0162)
-0,135 0,054 -0,136 -0,115
(0,0633) (0,0712) (0,0599) (0,0477)
-0,046 0,053 -0,079 -0,047
(0,0267) (0,03) (0,0253) (0,0201)
Observations 18 18 18 18
R-squared 0,531 0,220 0,646 0,998








Stoxx Europe 600 (at 0,22 and 0,998 respectively). Meaning the stock market index has a higher 
proportion of variance that is predictable from this model. Adjusted R-squared figures are similar in 
outcome, this time biggest differences are found between Total European PE (0,43) versus the Stoxx 
600 (0,997). Regard p-values of each coefficient, all variables in the model experienced their intercept 
coefficient being no higher than the 1% level (therefore not statistically relevant or interpretable). The 
Market variable coefficient was also found to be below the 1% mark in both the B&G funds and Stoxx 
Europe 600. All other remaining variables were considered statistically significant, and interpretable, 
in this regression model. Another consideration that stands out are the intercept coefficient in each 
PE segment being much larger than the public market equivalent – this indicated that alpha constant 
is a major reason behind much of the performance of European PE funds. It is not clear why the other 
coefficients, especially SMB and HML, do not influence PE returns significantly. 
The results in Figure 12 also show that 99,8% of the public market results can be justified 
through this model, unlike general PE returns that can only be explained by 53,1%. Most of the 
dependent variations in PE returns seem to be determined by other unobserved determinants, 
justifying the 46,9% difference. Alternative considerations are asymmetric information within the 
industry, as most funds are not forced to make public their financial information, and management 
bias. 
Sharpe ratio28 indications are demonstrated in Figure 13, this has the purpose to illustrate the 
returns per each unit of risk an investor would need to undertake. Overall, throughout the sampled 
time horizon, the PE industry in general (Total, VC, and B&G) far outperform the public market 
equivalent. This result is expected due to the impactful returns PE funds are able to extract when using 
leverage buyouts, for example, in their targeted investments. VC funds are found to be the closest to 
the European stock market index, confirming previously stated observations of tempered growth in 
European VC funds (due to tougher conditions in the sector). Looking at the mean results for each 
segment, the European PE industry went against preliminary expectations. This is because the larger 
the fund sample size the higher the standard deviations are (which goes against anticipation, as 
opposite is normally found to be true). The overall European PE industry shows the second highest 
upswing potential, considering the Min – Max gap, this may explain that there are other segments 
within the European PE industry that have demonstrated stronger growth potential when compared 
to VC and B&G funds. 
                                                            
28The formula to calculate the Sharpe Ratio is the following: SR = = , 




  Finally, in order to test return result under stressed conditions the sampled model criteria was 
altered to only study the time horizon during financial crisis (2007 to 2011). Even though the sample 
was effectively shortened (to only 5 observations), the model reflected that all p-values of each 
coefficient is above the 1% threshold (hence, significant and interpretable). The alpha intercept 
remains much larger in the PE industry as a whole, reflecting the expected large excess returns in the 
industry being justified by this variable. Other variables continue to not explain PE returns, as shown 
under previously (particular emphasis on SMB producing the lowest values across the board, including 
the stock market index). The negative return values for the public market index is justified due to the 
consequences of the financial crisis to the stock market, this event weighed especially heavily in 
Europe and many of the costs are still being felt today. 
 
 Under financial crisis conditions, PE returns are better explained by the Fama-French model. 
VC fund results can be explained by 99,3% (versus 22% in Figure 12) and the public market index 
improved further (99,9%). In Figure 15, we have the Sharpe Ratios for this same period. The findings 
replicate to a certain extent the values seen previously. With the Min-Max gap the largest upside 
potential overall is found in the stock market index, but the second largest upside is found in the 
general European PE industry. This means that other segments within the European PE space have 
interesting potential for large gains. 
Figure 13: Overview of Mean Sharpe Ratios, 1999-2016
Variables Obs. Mean Min Max
Total European Private Equity 18 0,48 0,30 0,61
European Venture Capital Funds 18 0,05 0,03 0,07
European Buyout and Growth Funds 18 0,12 0,09 0,14
Stoxx 600 Europe Index 18 -0,30 -14,40 5,59
Figure 14: PE Industry and Stoxx 600 Fama-French 3 Factor Regression, 2007-11 (Financial Crisis)
Variables Total European Private Equity
European Venture Capital 
Funds
European Buyout and Growth 
Funds
Stoxx 600 Europe Index
15,494 4,096 17,583 -3,611
(0,9721) (0,0572) (0,7551) (1,2486)
0,043 0,025 0,039 0,996
(0,0378) (0,0022) (0,0294) (0,0486)
-0,123 -0,030 -0,086 -0,164
(0,0993) (0,0058) (0,0772) (0,1276)
0,145 -0,071 0,098 -0,081
(0,1494) (0,0088) (0,1160) (0,1919)
Observations 5 5 5 5
R-squared 0,772 0,993 0,783 0,999









 However, relying on historical returns should be done with a pinch of salt. This is due to PE 
funds illiquid investments tending to lower the standard deviation of their results, causing these same 
investments to appear less volatile (and potentially justifying the ‘smoothed’ results in the PE industry 
during the financial crisis versus the public market index). Additionally, it is important to bear in mind 
that these ratios may be distorted if investment returns are not normally distributed. 
8. Conclusions 
Following an in depth look into the mechanisms and strategies that are involved in the Private 
Equity space, we are able to visualise the defining characteristics that determine the benchmarking of 
this alternative asset class of investment to other more traditional investment classes, most notably 
the stock market. The European PE fund market is the second largest destination for limited partners’ 
investment into PE funds. The most important thing to acknowledge is that these investors have a 
choice in the market and they need to weigh up the pros and the cons, this means that benchmarks 
need to be established in order to make sound investment decisions. 
By comparing directly, head-to-head, the European PE industry versus the largest, and most 
commonly monitored, stock market index in Europe one is able to gain a superficial overview as to the 
historical positions of the two. In this paper, we found that European PE fund market exceeds the 
STOXX Europe 600 for the majority of the sampled period horizon. By repeating this process, and 
utilising various methods of measuring fund results, one was able compare categorically that both 
Venture Capital strategy focused and Buyout Strategy funds generated overall excessive returns to 
their respective LPs. However, it was shown that the buyout funds were the overall champions, as 
they were found to of produced larger growth than the VC funds as well as the total PE fund market 
in as a whole.  
These positive results however do not come without consequence. It was found that the overall 
PE fund market is more volatile than that of traditional stocks. STOXX Europe 600 did have a high 
standard deviation number since its inception, this being justified by various economic events that 
brought with its volatility for this traditional asset class. These events were not contained to the stock 
markets, as ordinary companies where PE funds invested, and had equity stake in, also felt the 
Figure 15: Overview of Mean Sharpe Ratios, 2007-2011 (Financial Crisis)
Variables Obs. Mean Min Max
Total European Private Equity 5 0,47 0,36 0,55
European Venture Capital Funds 5 0,04 0,03 0,04
European Buyout and Growth Funds 5 0,13 0,12 0,14
Stoxx 600 Europe Index 5 -2,36 -14,40 1,95
31 
 
tumultuous events that where unfolding. For example, buyout funds normally enter into gearing 
practice in order to fully exploit the equity ratios of the company. If the company is not performing 
well then strategies need to alter, leading to returns that are lacklustre. Psychologists Kahneman and 
Tversky established that humans are twice as sensitive to having losses as they are to gains. This is 
known as cognitive bias “loss aversion” 29 Welch (2017) argues in “Private Equity’s Diversification 
Illusion”30 that PE fund accounting, handled by the portfolio managers “have incentives to obfuscate 
systematic risk and to choose investments that appear low-risk”. Thus, whilst public markets may take 
a dive, portfolio managers with large PE holdings might not have to book large losses. 
As an industry, PE firms will control businesses and then increase debt levels, to redirect spending 
that would have gone towards capital expenditures and other forms of investment, to pay down the 
initial financing debt. Consequentially, the growth of the business will slow. This occurs from a simple 
structural change that does not really demonstrate any expertise from the responsible management 
of the affected company. This does not mean at all that the debt, and its use, is always a bad thing – 
as an optimal capital-to-debt structure is important to maximize the value of the interest tax shield 
while at the same time reducing risks of potential financial distress. The case remains that many SME 
companies have too little debt in their balance sheets. The effective use of leverage was key to private 
equity’s historical success. Axelson, Jenkinson, et al. (2013) found that the average debt-to-enterprise 
value in the PE industry was around the 70% mark when pursuing a buyout transaction, whilst the 
equivalent within the public listed companies was of 35%.31 A 2013 study of 317 LBOs by researchers 
at the University of Texas found “little evidence of operating improvements subsequent to an LBO… 
Our results suggest that effecting a sustained change in capital structure is a conscious objective of 
the LBO structure.”32 Bain & Company’s 2017 Global Private Equity Report33 arrived to comparable 
conclusions. This report compares a deal model that forecasted revenues and EBITDA with the results 
from PE deals in their own proprietary database. The results demonstrated that more than two-thirds 
of the time, PE deals underperformed the EBITDA forecasts made at the time of purchase. This 
underperformance was masked, however, by almost two turns of multiple expansion at sale. “GPs had 
                                                            
29 See American Psychological Association article: The psychology of gains and losses: More complicated than 
previously thought http://www.apa.org/science/about/psa/2015/01/gains-losses.aspx 
 
30 See Welch (2017), Private Equity's Diversification Illusion: Evidence from Fair Value Accounting. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2379170 
 
31 See L’Her, Stoyanova, et al. (2016), A Bottom-up Approach to the Risk-Adjusted Performance of the Buyout 
Fund Market 
32 See Cohn, Mills, and Towery (2013) 





the good fortune to make up the shortfall in margin expansion through unforeseen multiple 
expansion,” according to the Bain report. Here once more, this report showed evidence suggesting 
that performance improvements are more superficial than concrete fact. 
An institutional still has entrenched expectations from PE returns that are entrenched in 
performances from the 1980s until the early 2000s. These premeditated expectations do not reflect 
the recent underperformance that has been cause be higher purchase prices. A bottom-up analysis of 
3,492 buyout transactions, from 1993 to 2014, to understand the risk characteristics of underlying 
companies34. Firstly, PE firms target and purchase companies that are meaningfully smaller than the 
public entities. With Thomson Reuters Eikon platform, it was found that no investment by a European 
PE fund has ever exceeded the average value of the STOXX 600 market capitalisation. Only 42 out of 
a sample of 7548 funds disclosed some financial information on Eikon. Their European PE industry’s 
total investments were only superior to the market capitalization of the smallest company in the index 
(Capita PLC), and yet only nine of the ‘larger’ funds disclosed full financials to the Eikon platform. 
Second, PE deals are significantly more levered via the use of debt for deal financing than is typical in 
public equity transactions. These two characteristics have existed continuously since the 1980s. 
This is alarming and market observers should give more importance PE’s price sensitivity to the 
use of debt. Higher prices require more debt, hence higher interest costs are undertaken (leading to 
higher solvency risk). A Preqin35 survey found that according to 70% of the participants their biggest 
challenge that they face was company valuations. Due to the high company valuations that industry 
experts are witnessing, there is a high level of ‘dry powder’36 and increased competition for assets 
(target companies), this has led to investors being concerned about the obtainable returns in the 
future. This has meant that the second biggest challenge that they were facing at were, somewhat 
worrisomely for the industry, the exit environment that are ongoing. Joe Baratta, Blackstone’s global 
head of private equity, said “this is the most difficult period we’ve ever experienced . . . You have 
historically high multiples of cash flows, low yields. I’ve never seen it in my career. It’s the most 
                                                            
34 See L’Her, Stoyanova, et al. (2016), A Bottom-up Approach to the Risk-Adjusted Performance of the Buyout 
Fund Market 




36 Dry powder is the informal term used to describe the amount of capital that is available to PE funds for the 




treacherous moment”37. In spite of being considered a difficult period for investors, Blackstone Capital 
was able to raise $18 billion in 2015 for their Partners VII fund (making it the largest fund had ever 
raised). 
Yet the unanimous thinking amongst institutional investors is leading them to shift money from 
public equity markets (which they consider overpriced and overly volatile) into PE markets. David 
Swensen, Yale’s chief investment officer, compares the short-term investment sentiment of public 
listed market to the five to seven-year time horizon of PE industry38. He believes that when you have 
PE firms who are the “hands-on operators that are going to improve the quality of the companies, 
there’s no pressure for quarter-to-quarter performance”. This is a common denunciation for big listed 
companies: they have no real owner protecting the long-term viability of a firm, or controlling 
managers by holding them accountable. Rather, CEOs respond to shareholders from time to time 
overtly focused on short-term events and reacting to movements in the stock price over the last year. 
PE firms, by contrast, are the direct owners that are forced to make the tough choices that are best 
for the long-term health of the company (at least in principle). 
This all leaves us with very important questions concerning the PE industry, especially in the 
European context: What is the contribution of PE to the current situation of ever-rising asset prices 
while GDP figures have been lacklustre at best compared to other geopolitical regions. And will today’s 
strong PE performance continue even through the next economic crisis or slowdown that may hit the 
region. If history is to serve as an indicator of future events, I believe that the European PE industry 
still has many years of attractive returns, and that these past results have solidified this alternative 
asset class as a significant destination for the investors. 
  
                                                            















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TOTAL EUROPEAN PRIVATE EQUITY
EUR (million €)
RVPI: Net to Limited Partners (LP)
Pooled Return (LP) Capital Weighted (LP) Average (LP) Top 5% (LP) Upper Quartile (LP) Median (LP) Low er Quartile (LP) Bottom 5% (LP) Standard Deviation (LP)
0,75 0,81 0,89 1,56 1,06 0,88 0,66 0,25 0,39
0,74 0,84 0,86 1,49 1,03 0,93 0,72 0,11 0,37
0,71 0,80 0,77 1,32 0,97 0,85 0,60 0,01 0,36
0,93 0,95 0,89 1,80 1,05 0,93 0,61 0,00 0,56
0,87 0,89 0,85 1,59 1,00 0,89 0,63 0,00 0,58
0,75 0,75 0,70 1,22 0,97 0,77 0,50 0,00 0,38
0,68 0,73 0,59 1,10 0,85 0,64 0,40 0,00 0,33
0,67 0,72 0,58 1,08 0,84 0,62 0,32 0,00 0,35
0,65 0,70 0,57 1,11 0,85 0,61 0,26 0,00 0,36
0,69 0,78 0,64 1,22 0,96 0,71 0,24 0,00 0,43
0,73 0,76 0,65 1,41 0,96 0,71 0,18 0,00 0,50
0,67 0,73 0,62 1,38 0,94 0,66 0,12 0,00 0,52
0,48 1,13 4,01 1,03 0,74 0,49 0,08 0,00 89,28
0,55 234,40 133,73 1,12 0,81 0,49 0,07 0,00 3.430,61
0,64 0,70 0,55 1,27 0,92 0,55 0,07 0,00 0,45
0,61 0,67 0,54 1,23 0,92 0,52 0,05 0,00 0,46
0,62 0,67 0,55 1,26 0,96 0,53 0,02 0,00 0,49
0,59 1,99 2,30 1,29 0,96 0,50 0,01 0,00 50,12
0,56 0,63 0,52 1,38 0,93 0,43 0,00 0,00 0,50
0,54 0,60 0,51 1,40 0,93 0,35 0,00 0,00 0,52
0,51 0,58 0,47 1,36 0,90 0,26 0,00 0,00 0,51
1. All data shown as net to Limited Partners, unless otherwise noted.
2. All IRRs greater than one year are annualized.
3. Vintage Year definition: First Cash Flow, Quartile Methodology: Rank Selected Sample.
4. IRRs in excess of 1,000% are excluded from the Average and Standard Deviation calculations.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RVPI: Net to Limited Partners (LP)
Pooled Return (LP) Capital Weighted (LP) Average (LP) Top 5% (LP) Upper Quartile (LP) Median (LP) Lower Quartile (LP) Bottom 5% (LP) Standard Deviation (LP)
0,85 0,85 0,94 1,68 1,05 0,91 0,70 0,46 0,40
0,57 0,59 0,85 1,18 1,00 0,87 0,75 0,32 0,29
0,37 0,46 0,75 1,10 0,99 0,89 0,46 0,27 0,32
0,51 0,65 1,03 1,97 1,30 1,00 0,72 0,21 0,58
0,76 0,80 1,18 3,01 1,23 0,97 0,78 0,24 0,90
0,52 0,63 0,79 1,29 0,99 0,84 0,58 0,08 0,39
0,41 0,49 0,56 1,00 0,74 0,58 0,43 0,01 0,29
0,37 0,44 0,49 0,94 0,65 0,53 0,30 0,01 0,29
0,40 0,46 0,48 0,95 0,64 0,52 0,28 0,00 0,27
0,48 0,56 0,55 1,00 0,79 0,61 0,27 0,00 0,37
0,52 0,61 0,57 1,03 0,83 0,66 0,24 0,00 0,36
0,49 0,57 0,52 1,03 0,81 0,58 0,19 0,00 0,36
0,41 0,47 0,41 0,90 0,65 0,38 0,13 0,00 0,32
0,39 0,47 0,40 0,98 0,72 0,38 0,09 0,00 0,34
0,42 0,49 0,42 1,12 0,75 0,30 0,06 0,00 0,40
0,43 0,48 0,42 1,21 0,73 0,23 0,04 0,00 0,42
0,46 0,52 0,45 1,26 0,69 0,23 0,02 0,00 0,49
0,49 0,55 0,48 1,55 0,81 0,31 0,01 0,00 0,53
0,54 0,60 0,51 1,52 0,88 0,29 0,00 0,00 0,57
0,59 0,63 0,54 1,82 0,93 0,29 0,00 0,00 0,63






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































RVPI: Net to Limited Partners (LP)
Pooled Return (LP) Capital Weighted (LP) Average (LP) Top 5% (LP) Upper Quartile (LP) Median (LP) Lower Quartile (LP) Bottom 5% (LP) Standard Deviation (LP)
0,72 0,81 0,88 1,49 1,05 0,89 0,67 0,19 0,39
0,78 0,87 0,86 1,52 1,03 0,94 0,70 0,09 0,38
0,78 0,84 0,77 1,37 0,97 0,85 0,60 0,01 0,37
0,99 0,99 0,85 1,72 1,05 0,92 0,59 0,00 0,57
0,89 0,91 0,74 1,36 0,98 0,86 0,50 0,00 0,41
0,78 0,76 0,66 1,21 0,95 0,72 0,42 0,00 0,39
0,71 0,76 0,57 1,07 0,87 0,64 0,29 0,00 0,35
0,70 0,75 0,56 1,06 0,87 0,62 0,25 0,00 0,37
0,67 0,71 0,54 1,12 0,85 0,58 0,18 0,00 0,39
0,70 0,78 0,57 1,24 0,92 0,63 0,10 0,00 0,44
0,73 0,74 0,57 1,40 0,93 0,51 0,05 0,00 0,55
0,66 0,73 0,56 1,49 0,92 0,44 0,02 0,00 0,60
0,45 0,50 0,38 0,97 0,67 0,31 0,01 0,00 0,36
0,53 325,65 252,80 1,05 0,77 0,36 0,00 0,00 4.721,65
0,62 0,69 0,47 1,25 0,85 0,38 0,00 0,00 0,46
0,58 0,64 0,45 1,14 0,85 0,32 0,00 0,00 0,47
0,58 0,64 0,46 1,26 0,87 0,30 0,00 0,00 0,51
0,54 0,61 0,45 1,27 0,86 0,26 0,00 0,00 0,49
0,51 0,57 0,41 1,25 0,79 0,22 0,00 0,00 0,47
0,46 0,52 0,38 1,28 0,76 0,13 0,00 0,00 0,46
0,44 0,50 0,37 1,20 0,75 0,08 0,00 0,00 0,46
1. All data shown as net to Limited Partners, unless otherwise noted.
2. All IRRs greater than one year are annualized.
3. Vintage Year definition: First Cash Flow, Quartile Methodology: Rank Selected Sample.
4. IRRs in excess of 1,000% are excluded from the Average and Standard Deviation calculations.







STOXX Europe 600 EUR Price Index | Price History | Thomson Reuters Eikon                                       
.STOXX
Interval: Quarterly
History Period: 20 Years
VAP: Total 953,77B
Price Volume Count
350 - 400 268,2629B 14
300 - 350 267,2317B 14
250 - 300 266,6684B 14
200 - 250 106,8506B 5
150 - 200 44,7582B 2
.STOXX Price Statistics     Quarterly     20 Years
Price Change
High 415,18 30-Jun-2015 Max 28,75B 30-Jun-2007 Advancing 526,92B Up 50 Up +24,87% 31-Dec-1999 Max 23,39T 31-Mar-2018
Low 155,38 31-Mar-2009 Min 12,07B 31-Mar-2006 Declining 426,85B Down 30 Down -23,33% 30-Sep-2002 Min 2,37B 31-Mar-2014
Avg 299,81 Avg 11,82B Total 953,77B Unch 0 Period +32,36% 20 Years Avg 2,16T
.STOXX Price History     Quarterly     20 Years
Exchange Date Close Net %Chg Open Low High Volume Turnover Approx VWAP O-C H-L %CVol %CTurn
31-Mar-2018 381,10 -8,08 -2,08% 389,15 367,50 403,72 8.224.463.859 23.394.521.280.000,00 -8,05 36,22 -37,79% +30,65%
31-Dec-2017 389,18 +1,02 +0,26% 388,43 379,94 398,05 13.219.789.587 17.906.419.880.000,00 0,75 18,11 +7,56% +1.070,58%
30-Sep-2017 388,16 +8,79 +2,32% 379,96 365,99 388,16 12.290.203.739 1.529.705.310.000,00 8,20 22,17 -23,70% -13,59%
30-Jun-2017 379,37 -1,77 -0,46% 382,19 376,23 396,55 16.107.839.190 1.770.312.860.000,00 -2,82 20,32 +0,37% +5,58%
31-Mar-2017 381,14 +19,72 +5,46% 361,24 359,92 381,50 16.049.170.584 1.676.803.160.000,00 19,90 21,58 -7,45% +6,07%
31-Dec-2016 361,42 +18,50 +5,39% 342,18 327,02 361,66 17.341.554.070 1.580.785.600.000,00 19,24 34,64 -2,74% +12,57%
30-Sep-2016 342,92 +13,04 +3,95% 330,51 317,24 351,77 17.830.747.280 1.404.249.540.000,00 12,41 34,53 -16,23% -13,52%
30-Jun-2016 329,88 -7,66 -2,27% 335,88 307,81 351,51 21.284.891.677 1.623.786.270.000,00 -6,00 43,70 +3,43% -7,66%
31-Mar-2016 337,54 -28,27 -7,73% 365,48 302,59 365,48 20.578.512.819 1.758.471.360.000,00 -27,94 62,89 +26,81% +8,71%
31-Dec-2015 365,81 +18,04 +5,19% 349,73 343,21 387,43 16.228.370.801 1.617.650.880.000,00 16,08 44,22 -8,29% -12,85%
30-Sep-2015 347,77 -33,54 -8,80% 382,76 331,98 408,73 17.694.854.110 1.856.225.620.000,00 -34,99 76,75 +1,07% +0,56%
30-Jun-2015 381,31 -15,99 -4,02% 396,39 378,07 415,18 17.507.401.705 1.845.910.440.000,00 -15,08 37,11 -15,48% +2,82%
31-Mar-2015 397,30 +54,76 +15,99% 343,95 330,85 404,51 20.712.749.666 1.795.212.470.000,00 53,35 73,66 +5,40% +11,39%
31-Dec-2014 342,54 -0,54 -0,16% 342,70 302,48 350,99 19.652.010.972 1.611.659.110.000,00 -0,16 48,51 +17,03% +497,95%
30-Sep-2014 343,08 +1,22 +0,36% 342,36 322,40 350,85 16.791.898.562 269.528.770.700,00 0,72 28,45 -1,42% +1.766,78%
30-Jun-2014 341,86 +7,55 +2,26% 334,98 325,50 349,71 17.033.954.941 14.438.202.600,00 6,88 24,21 -13,47% +510,05%
31-Mar-2014 334,31 +6,05 +1,84% 328,99 315,61 338,90 19.686.275.246 2.366.728.700,00 5,32 23,29 +21,64% -99,84%
31-Dec-2013 328,26 +17,80 +5,73% 310,68 304,45 328,42 16.184.633.269 1.461.403.852.800,00 17,58 23,97 +1,40%
30-Sep-2013 310,46 +25,44 +8,93% 286,60 282,65 317,18 15.961.636.964 23,86 34,53 -13,82%
30-Jun-2013 285,02 -8,76 -2,98% 293,87 274,97 310,59 18.522.008.732 -8,85 35,62 +1,13%
31-Mar-2013 293,78 +14,10 +5,04% 281,56 281,56 298,90 18.314.179.746 548.522.700.800,00 12,22 17,34 +25,64% -28,24%
31-Dec-2012 279,68 +11,20 +4,17% 268,35 262,86 282,11 14.576.367.498 764.396.748.800,00 11,33 19,25 -9,93%
30-Sep-2012 268,48 +17,31 +6,89% 251,69 249,77 276,56 16.183.493.348 16,79 26,79 -17,54%
30-Jun-2012 251,17 -12,15 -4,61% 263,85 233,48 267,62 19.625.435.396 -12,68 34,14 -0,87%
31-Mar-2012 263,32 +18,78 +7,68% 244,54 244,54 272,86 19.797.815.724 18,78 28,32 +6,64%
31-Dec-2011 244,54 +18,36 +8,12% 226,55 214,58 251,45 18.565.151.454 2.776.296.499.200,00 17,99 36,87 -20,26% +456,08%
30-Sep-2011 226,18 -46,68 -17,11% 272,82 209,26 278,01 23.281.772.530 499.261.248.300,00 -46,64 68,75 +25,15% -67,34%
30-Jun-2011 272,86 -3,04 -1,10% 276,12 263,22 285,18 18.602.426.181 1.528.787.405.800,00 -3,26 21,96 -5,26% -11,95%
31-Mar-2011 275,90 +0,09 +0,03% 276,28 262,13 292,16 19.634.964.763 1.736.359.798.700,00 -0,38 30,03 +19,59% +22,25%
31-Dec-2010 275,81 +16,09 +6,20% 259,54 256,62 282,00 16.418.516.290 1.420.346.882.400,00 16,27 25,38 -5,72% +0,03%
30-Sep-2010 259,72 +16,40 +6,74% 241,77 236,29 267,78 17.415.269.558 1.419.962.397.000,00 17,95 31,49 -29,81% -25,07%
30-Jun-2010 243,32 -20,25 -7,68% 264,63 229,74 272,62 24.810.070.063 1.895.075.814.900,00 -21,31 42,88 +26,18% +21,15%
31-Mar-2010 263,57 +9,68 +3,81% 254,24 235,38 265,48 19.663.174.908 1.564.269.483.900,00 9,33 30,10 +11,01% +10,28%
31-Dec-2009 253,89 +11,42 +4,71% 242,74 232,54 254,60 17.713.160.009 1.418.404.836.200,00 11,15 22,06 -7,22% -0,35%
30-Sep-2009 242,47 +36,64 +17,80% 206,01 195,24 246,74 19.092.080.008 1.423.386.903.900,00 36,46 51,50 -9,52% -3,74%
30-Jun-2009 205,83 +29,37 +16,64% 176,52 173,43 215,37 21.101.573.666 1.478.669.918.300,00 29,31 41,94 -1,00% +6,62%
31-Mar-2009 176,46 -21,90 -11,04% 199,30 155,38 214,21 21.314.043.083 1.386.884.504.000,00 -22,84 58,83 -9,09% -30,73%
31-Dec-2008 198,36 -57,69 -22,53% 256,98 179,72 263,92 23.444.140.062 2.002.175.027.600,00 -58,62 84,20 -9,68% -23,96%
30-Sep-2008 256,05 -33,34 -11,52% 288,88 244,73 293,71 25.957.833.447 2.633.205.494.300,00 -32,83 48,98 +7,07% +1,14%
30-Jun-2008 289,39 -16,57 -5,42% 305,80 283,92 332,87 24.243.730.430 2.603.531.207.100,00 -16,41 48,95 -12,11% -20,38%
31-Mar-2008 305,96 -58,68 -16,09% 363,55 290,26 365,44 27.582.887.866 3.270.084.676.200,00 -57,59 75,18 +8,13% -6,26%
31-Dec-2007 364,64 -13,22 -3,50% 377,30 347,72 391,30 25.509.899.154 3.488.338.396.100,00 -12,66 43,58 -9,74% -8,79%
30-Sep-2007 377,86 -15,85 -4,03% 392,59 348,90 400,99 28.261.411.369 3.824.503.495.800,00 -14,73 52,09 -1,69% +1,39%
30-Jun-2007 393,71 +19,49 +5,21% 374,32 373,29 400,73 28.747.901.178 3.771.993.449.300,00 19,39 27,44 +12,50% +7,74%
31-Mar-2007 374,22 +8,96 +2,45% 365,74 351,35 382,85 25.553.838.409 3.500.953.410.900,00 8,48 31,50 +13,53% +26,34%
31-Dec-2006 365,26 +23,83 +6,98% 341,93 338,79 366,84 22.508.309.840 2.771.016.076.000,00 23,33 28,05 +11,26% +17,70%
30-Sep-2006 341,43 +20,77 +6,48% 320,72 308,30 343,18 20.230.238.245 2.354.284.110.300,00 20,71 34,88 -17,91% -20,16%
30-Jun-2006 320,66 -13,78 -4,12% 334,93 299,71 344,39 24.644.337.456 2.948.803.310.200,00 -14,27 44,68 +104,10% +3.454,13%
31-Mar-2006 334,44 +24,41 +7,87% 310,01 309,29 338,11 12.074.839.699 82.968.410.000,00 24,43 28,82
31-Dec-2005 310,03 +12,63 +4,25% 297,63 280,91 311,86 12,40 30,95
30-Sep-2005 297,40 +21,48 +7,78% 275,85 267,88 297,75 21,55 29,87
30-Jun-2005 275,92 +13,73 +5,24% 262,29 254,38 278,65 13,63 24,27
31-Mar-2005 262,19 +11,08 +4,41% 251,24 250,04 268,30 10,95 18,26
31-Dec-2004 251,11 +13,37 +5,62% 237,89 235,77 251,66 13,22 15,89
30-Sep-2004 237,74 -3,12 -1,30% 241,34 225,18 242,82 -3,60 17,64
30-Jun-2004 240,86 +4,27 +1,80% 236,89 228,88 248,15 3,97 19,27
31-Mar-2004 236,59 +7,28 +3,17% 229,41 229,41 247,57 7,18 18,16
31-Dec-2003 229,31 +22,45 +10,85% 206,77 206,32 229,63 22,54 23,31
30-Sep-2003 206,86 +3,92 +1,93% 202,61 198,26 223,11 4,25 24,85
30-Jun-2003 202,94 +26,53 +15,04% 176,38 176,05 210,98 26,56 34,93
31-Mar-2003 176,41 -26,84 -13,21% 203,18 162,24 211,97 -26,77 49,73
31-Dec-2002 203,25 +8,49 +4,36% 194,94 186,84 226,67 8,31 39,83
30-Sep-2002 194,76 -59,28 -23,33% 253,43 188,26 257,37 -58,67 69,11
30-Jun-2002 254,04 -49,00 -16,17% 302,67 236,87 302,82 -48,63 65,95
31-Mar-2002 303,04 +4,88 +1,64% 296,87 279,18 303,20 6,17 24,02
31-Dec-2001 298,16 +31,87 +11,97% 266,24 255,89 302,16 31,92 46,27
30-Sep-2001 266,29 -63,06 -19,15% 329,35 225,46 334,10 -63,06 108,64
30-Jun-2001 329,35 +7,65 +2,38% 321,96 302,63 351,65 7,39 49,02
31-Mar-2001 321,70 -38,09 -10,59% 357,39 299,34 365,04 -35,69 65,70
31-Dec-2000 359,79 -17,65 -4,68% 377,04 349,72 390,20 -17,25 40,48
30-Sep-2000 377,44 +0,70 +0,19% 377,72 369,43 404,97 -0,28 35,54
30-Jun-2000 376,74 -17,36 -4,40% 394,47 355,64 401,77 -17,73 46,13
31-Mar-2000 394,10 +14,61 +3,85% 383,54 349,67 407,56 10,56 57,89
31-Dec-1999 379,49 +75,58 +24,87% 303,48 293,08 380,11 76,01 87,03
30-Sep-1999 303,91 -5,78 -1,87% 313,92 291,11 326,09 -10,01 34,98
30-Jun-1999 309,69 +12,54 +4,22% 295,83 295,23 319,63 13,86 24,40
31-Mar-1999 297,15 +17,84 +6,39% 279,92 271,98 301,29 17,23 29,31
31-Dec-1998 279,31 +43,45 +18,42% 230,19 209,75 281,33 49,12 71,58
30-Sep-1998 235,86 -61,66 -20,72% 299,07 230,76 315,72 -63,21 84,96
30-Jun-1998 297,52 +9,60 +3,33% 288,01 276,33 301,67 9,51 25,34
31-Mar-1998 287,92 259,40 258,74 293,93 28,52 35,19







Euro 1 Year EURIBOR | Price History | Thomson Reuters Eikon                                          
EURIBOR 12M
Interval: Yearly
History Period: 20 Years
EURIBOR1YD= Price Statistics     Yearly     20 Years
Price Change
High -0,191 31-Dec-2018 Up 9 Up +41,63% 31-Dec-2006
Low -0,192 31-Dec-2018 Down 11 Down -236,67% 31-Dec-2016
Avg 2,047 Unch 0 Period -105,94% 20 Years
EURIBOR1YD= Price History     Yearly     20 Years
Exchange Date Year Bid Ask High Low Open RefreshRate BidNet Bid%Chg
31-Dec-1998 1998 3,2
31-Dec-1999 1999 3,9 +0,663 +20,63%
31-Dec-2000 2000 4,7 +0,873 +22,52%
31-Dec-2001 2001 3,3 -1,408 -29,65%
31-Dec-2002 2002 2,7 -0,592 -17,72%
31-Dec-2003 2003 2,3 -0,444 -16,15%
31-Dec-2004 2004 2,4 +0,051 +2,21%
31-Dec-2005 2005 2,8 +0,488 +20,71%
31-Dec-2006 2006 4,0 +1,184 +41,63%
31-Dec-2007 2007 4,7 +0,717 +17,80%
31-Dec-2008 2008 3,0 -1,696 -35,74%
31-Dec-2009 2009 1,2 -1,801 -59,07%
31-Dec-2010 2010 1,5 +0,259 +20,75%
31-Dec-2011 2011 1,9 +0,440 +29,20%
31-Dec-2012 2012 0,5 -1,405 -72,16%
31-Dec-2013 2013 0,6 +0,014 +2,58%
31-Dec-2014 2014 0,3 -0,231 -41,55%
31-Dec-2015 2015 0,1 -0,265 -81,54%
31-Dec-2016 2016 -0,1 -0,142 -236,67%
31-Dec-2017 2017 -0,2 -0,104 -126,83%
31-Dec-2018 2018 -0,2 -0,191 -0,192 -0,192 -0,005 -2,69%













Fund Name Sum of Equity Invested in Search Range  (EUR)
CVC Capital Partners Ltd - Unspecified Fund 5.797.225.271
European Investment Fund - Unspecified Fund 3.421.309.357
Wendel SA - Unspecified Fund 2.850.147.927
Permira Europe IV 2.733.013.000
SoftBank Vision Fund L.P. 2.695.593.128
Fund Name Avg Equity Per Company in Search Range  (EUR)
CVC European Equity Partners V, L.P. 385.424.802
BC European Capital VI 275.889.108
Spinnaker Capital, Ltd. - Unspecified Fund 271.064.936
SoftBank Vision Fund L.P. 269.559.313
Peninsula Participacoes SA- Unspecified Fund 262.415.561
Fund Name Avg Equity Per Deal in Search Range  (EUR)
Spinnaker Capital, Ltd. - Unspecified Fund 271.064.935,65
CVC European Equity Partners V, L.P. 256.949.868,23
BC European Capital VI 248.300.196,97
FCPR Fund IV 232.113.599,13
SoftBank Vision Fund L.P. 224.632.760,67
Fund Name No. of Companies in Search Range
Bpifrance Investissement SAS - Unspecified Fund 432
High-Tech Gruenderfonds Management GmbH - Unspecified Fund 414
3i (from published accounts) 403
3i UK MBO Fund II 396
BNP Paribas Developpement SA - Unspecified Fund 281
Fund Name No. of Deals in Search Range
3i (from published accounts) 712
High-Tech Gruenderfonds Management GmbH - Unspecified Fund 588
3i UK MBO Fund II 475
Index Ventures - Unspecified Fund 475





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Returns Report - ALL EUROPEAN FUNDS BY VINTAGE AS OF 31 DECEMBER 2016
Since Inception to 2016 Q4, EUR (million €)
RVPI: Net to Limited Partners (LP)
Pooled Return (LP) Capital Weighted (LP) Average (LP) Top 5% (LP) Upper Quartile (LP) Median (LP) Lower Quartile (LP) Bottom 5% (LP) Standard Deviation (LP)
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,00 0,00 --- 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 --- --- 0,00 --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 --- --- 0,00 --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,00 0,00 --- 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,08 0,08 --- 0,14 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,07
0,01 0,01 0,02 0,10 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,05
0,01 0,01 0,02 0,09 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,03
0,03 0,03 0,06 0,28 0,08 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,10
0,04 0,04 0,10 0,48 0,10 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,16
0,12 0,11 0,08 0,37 0,11 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,13
0,09 0,09 0,08 0,30 0,12 0,04 0,00 0,00 0,10
0,07 0,07 0,13 0,45 0,19 0,07 0,03 0,00 0,15
0,22 0,22 0,27 0,83 0,35 0,18 0,06 0,00 0,34
0,46 0,46 --- 1,28 0,64 0,41 0,21 0,00 0,39
0,42 0,40 0,52 1,09 0,78 0,52 0,23 0,01 0,37
0,69 0,69 0,62 1,21 0,88 0,59 0,23 0,01 0,42
0,81 0,82 --- 1,77 1,16 0,92 0,68 0,02 0,52
0,88 0,89 0,76 1,56 1,08 0,77 0,20 0,01 0,54
1,13 1,15 0,94 1,75 1,17 0,95 0,69 0,01 0,49
1,12 1,11 1,09 1,73 1,19 1,07 0,87 0,59 0,45
1,04 1,06 1,02 1,42 1,10 1,02 0,89 0,69 0,22
1,12 1,09 1,08 1,73 1,22 1,01 0,91 0,76 0,34
0,99 0,93 0,98 1,37 1,02 0,96 0,90 0,50 0,39
1,01 1,07 0,90 1,08 0,97 0,89 0,84 0,71 0,23






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Returns Report - VENTURE CAPITAL FUNDS BY VINTAGE YEAR AS OF 31 DECEMBER 2016
Since Inception to 2016 Q4, EUR (million €)
RVPI: Net to Limited Partners (LP)
Pooled Return (LP) Capital Weighted (LP) Average (LP) Top 5% (LP) Upper Quartile (LP) Median (LP) Lower Quartile (LP) Bottom 5% (LP) Standard Deviation (LP)
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 --- --- --- --- --- ---
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,01 0,01 0,00 --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 --- --- 0,00 --- --- ---
0,01 0,01 0,02 --- --- 0,00 --- --- ---
0,04 0,04 0,04 0,12 0,07 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,05
0,12 0,12 0,10 0,33 0,16 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,12
0,19 0,19 0,17 0,57 0,27 0,05 0,02 0,00 0,24
0,19 0,20 0,26 --- --- --- --- --- ---
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,45 0,45 0,42 0,84 0,49 0,40 0,20 0,18 0,26
0,78 0,79 0,89 1,39 1,19 0,70 0,54 0,50 0,38
0,83 0,81 0,85 --- --- 0,84 --- --- ---
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
1,77 1,77 1,69 --- --- --- --- --- ---
1,05 1,03 0,89 --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,96 0,92 1,20 --- --- --- --- --- ---
1,50 1,44 1,39 2,47 1,62 1,24 1,00 0,69 0,69
1,03 1,03 1,09 --- --- --- --- --- ---
1,26 1,23 1,29 1,87 1,45 1,24 0,96 0,90 0,39
1,20 1,32 --- --- --- 0,91 --- --- ---
0,84 0,84 --- --- --- 0,84 --- --- ---

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Returns Report - BUYOUT AND GROWTH FUNDS BY VINTAGE YEAR AS OF 31 DECEMBER 2016
Since Inception to 2016 Q4, EUR (million €)
RVPI: Net to Limited Partners (LP)
Pooled Return (LP) Capital Weighted (LP) Average (LP) Top 5% (LP) Upper Quartile (LP) Median (LP) Lower Quartile (LP) Bottom 5% (LP) Standard Deviation (LP)
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 --- --- 0,00 --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 --- --- --- 0,00 --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,00 0,00 0,00 --- --- 0,00 --- --- ---
0,00 0,00 --- 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
0,08 0,08 0,02 0,22 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,08
0,01 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,05
0,00 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01
0,01 0,01 0,02 0,12 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,05
0,01 0,01 0,03 0,11 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,07
0,13 0,12 0,05 0,24 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,13
0,09 0,09 0,08 0,34 0,12 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,12
0,06 0,06 --- 0,54 0,08 0,05 0,03 0,00 0,18
0,18 0,18 --- 0,59 0,23 0,13 0,04 0,00 0,22
0,34 0,34 0,39 1,04 0,52 0,33 0,13 0,00 0,34
0,40 0,38 --- 0,97 0,67 0,41 0,17 0,00 0,39
0,73 0,73 0,64 1,11 0,78 0,68 0,49 0,12 0,30
0,67 0,68 0,80 1,25 1,02 0,80 0,69 0,21 0,36
1,11 1,12 1,04 1,38 1,34 1,08 0,74 0,62 0,33
1,21 1,23 1,09 1,75 1,49 1,02 0,86 0,45 0,49
1,12 1,11 1,02 1,38 1,16 1,02 0,87 0,66 0,23
1,19 1,18 --- 1,39 1,25 1,11 1,03 0,88 0,18
1,15 1,10 1,04 1,44 1,20 1,12 0,91 0,64 0,34
0,98 0,84 0,84 1,05 1,01 0,96 0,88 0,07 0,33
0,91 0,89 --- 1,01 0,96 0,92 0,85 0,52 0,22
0,44 0,50 0,37 1,20 0,75 0,08 0,00 0,00 0,46
55 
 
10. Appendix B: Private Equity Terminology 
Alternative investment: An asset not considered as a conventional investment (e.g. stocks, bonds, 
cash). Alternative investments include venture capital, private equity, hedge funds and real estate. 
Asset allocation: The mix of investments in a portfolio. To balance risk and reward, asset allocation is 
determined by investment goals, risk tolerance and time. 
Asset-based lending: Any form of lending to a business that is collateralized or secured by a balance 
sheet asset. Pledged assets can include inventory, equipment or the accounts receivable that will be 
transferred in the event of default by the debtor. 
Asset deal: When the assets of a company are acquired instead of shares. 
Benchmark: Comparing a funds returns to the performance of similar funds and/or a Public Market 
Equivalent. 
Board of directors: A group that is selected to represent shareholders’ interests with regard to 
company policies or significant company decisions. VC and PE investors will often have places as 
executives in the boards of their portfolio companies. 
Book runner: The main entity responsible for the issuance of new equity, debt and other securities.  
Buyout/Leveraged buyout: A buyout is the private equity transaction method that involves a target 
company being acquired in its entirety, or by a significant amount. A leveraged buyout involves the 
use of a mix of cash and debt to acquire equity. 
Capital call: When a general partner is ready to make an investment, it will ask its limited partners for 
the capital they’ve already committed to the fund. 
Capital overhang/Dry powder: The amount of capital available in a fund for investors to invest. 
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Carried interest: A general partner’s share of the capital gains from a fund, usually 20%. 
Chapter 11: The section of the US Bankruptcy Code that outlines the process for asset reorganization. 
Co-investment: When a limited partner invests directly in a company alongside a general partner, 
instead of through a general partner. 
Condition precedent: A condition for closing a negotiated agreement such as securing approval from 
regulators. 
Convertible debt: Debt that can be converted to equity when certain conditions are met, like a 
specific valuation or date. 
Corporate acquisition: When a corporation purchases another company for strategic purposes. 
Corporate venture capital: When a corporation has a venture capital team that invests in early-stage 
companies that align with the corporation’s goals. 
Crowdfunding: The process of raising small amounts of capital from many people to fund a venture. 
Data room: A secure, digital location where potential investors can review the confidential information 
of a target company. This includes for example financial statements, company intellectual property 
and client contracts. 
Deal flow: The number of transactions that have closed during a given period. 
Debt pushdown: When the acquisition debt is transferred to the operating company rather than the 
company that generates the operating cash flow, if such a distinction exists. 
Disbursement: The capital investors give to companies. 
57 
 
Distressed investment: An investment made into a company experiencing liquidity, capitalization 
and/or underperformance issues. 
Distributed to Paid-In (DPI): The value of all distributions divided by the amount limited partners have 
contributed to the fund. 
Distribution: The capital limited partners receive from general partners after they exit an investment. 
Due diligence: The vetting, analysing and assessing of individuals, companies and investors before 
engaging in a transaction. 
Early stage: The period of venture capital investment between seed and late stage deals, when 
companies have a proven concept and little revenue. 
EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization): A company’s net profit plus 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization. 
Enterprise value (EV): A company’s value calculated as market capitalization, including all debt and 
equity interests, minus excess cash. 
Exit: When an investor sells its equity in a portfolio company. 
Family office: A firm that manages assets, investments and trusts for a wealthy family. 
Final close: When a general partner stops fundraising. 
Fund: An investment vehicle for limited partners, managed by general partners. Limited partners 
commit capital to funds, and general partners invest the capital into assets. 
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Fund-of-funds: A fund that invests in other funds. A fund-of-funds devotes all its time to evaluating 
fund managers, which usually leads to above-average returns. However, there are extra fees 
associated with investing in a fund-of-funds. 
Fundraising: When general partners ask for capital commitments from limited partners. 
General partner (GP): An entity that raises capital from limited partners for a fund and determines 
which assets the fund should invest in. 
Growth equity investment: When an investor gives a mature company capital it can use to expand or 
restructure in exchange for equity (usually a minority stake). 
Institutional investor: An entity that invests on the behalf of organizations, companies and/or 
individuals. Common examples are university endowments, insurance companies and pension funds. 
Internal rate of return (IRR): The rate at which the net present value of all cash flows from an 
investment will equal zero. IRR is commonly used to measurement for fund performance. 
Investment bank: A financial institution that serves as an agent or underwriter for security issuances. 
Some investment banks also act as brokers/dealers and provide advisory services for mergers, 
acquisitions, restructurings and other transactions. 
Late stage: The final period of venture capital investment (usually after Series C), when companies 
have increased revenue and are near exit. 
Legal continuity: The question of whether the target company’s existing contracts should be retained 
after an acquisition. In asset deals, prior agreements typically cease and must be entered into 
again. Legal continuity rarely impacts share deals. 
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Leverage: The use of debt in an investment, including acquisitions and capital expenditures. With 
leverage, general partners can expedite improvements to portfolio companies and amplify returns. 
Limited partner (LP): An entity that commits capital to a general partner’s fund.    
Limited partnership: The relationship between a general partner and its limited partners. 
Management buyout (MBO): A buyout a company’s management team leads or participates in. 
Management fee: The amount general partners charge limited partners to operate a fund. The fee 
normally is between 0.5% – 3% of the called capital amount. 
Mezzanine investment: A financing round between senior and subordinated loans that typically 
includes equity-based options in the form of warrants. 
Middle-market Company: A company with an enterprise value between $25 million and $1 billion. 
Multiple arbitrage: The investment gains achieved by the increase in the sales multiple relative to 
the original investment multiple. 
Normalized working capital: An analysis of a target company that accounts for all one-off or the non-
recurring items to determine how working capital normally operates. 
Paid-in capital: The amount of committed capital that has been transferred from the limited partner 
to the general partner. 
Portfolio Company: A company that has received an investment from a venture capital or private 
equity firm. 
Private equity: Capital that is not registered on a public stock exchange. Private equity involves 
investors giving private companies capital in exchange for equity. 
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Public market equivalent: An analysis that compares a private fund’s performance to a public 
benchmark or index. 
Residual value to paid in (RVPI): The value of all remaining investments in a fund relative to the 
amount limited partners have contributed the fund. 
Secondary market: When one limited partner sells its alternative investments to another limited 
partner. Limited partners do this for a variety of reasons, including to adjust their asset allocation. 
Senior debt: The debt that takes priority over other securities in the event of liquidation. 
Series A to D+: The identification of venture rounds after seed. 
Sovereign wealth fund: A state-owned investment fund designed to protect and/or grow a range of 
financial assets, including stocks, bonds and natural resources. 
Strategic acquisition: When a corporation acquires a company for its technology, products or services. 
Subordinated debt: Loans that have a lower priority than senior debt in the event of liquidation. 
Target company: The entity purchased by an acquirer. 
Target working capital: An amount recorded during negotiations to reflect a historical analysis of the 
working capital requirements of a target company. It reflects closing accounts as well as an increased 
or decreased price if a target company has more or less working capital than the target capital on the 
date of the closing accounts. 
Total value to paid in (TVPI): The value of all remaining investments in a fund plus the value of all 
distributions relative to the amount limited partners have contributed to the fund. 
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Underwriting: When investment banks issue debt and equity securities on behalf of corporations and 
governments to generate investment capital. 
Unicorn: A venture capital-backed company with a valuation of $1 billion (or more). 
Venture capital: A type of private equity investing that focuses on start-ups and early-stage 
companies with long-term, high-growth potential. 
Vintage year: When a fund closes and starts investing. 
Warrant: A security that gives the holder the option to purchase a company’s stock at a 
predetermined price for a specified period. 
Working capital: The customers, suppliers, inventories and other assets and liabilities required 
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